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R.EsPoNsmILITY OF STATES FOR UNLAWFUL Acrs OF THEIR ARMED 
FORCES. By Alwyn V. Freeman. [Text of lectures reprinted from the 
Recueil de Cours de l'Academie de Droit International de La Haye 
(1955 II, Pp. 267-415, Vol. 88 of the Series) for private circulation only.] 
Dr. Freeman has had reprinted in book form for private publication 
his Hague Lectures in 1955 on the significant and specialized topic of the 
responsibility of states for unlawful acts of their armed forces. Appendices 
containing diplomatic notes, United States Government memoranda, 
Allied control laws and regulations, international agreements, and congres-
sional documents increase the value of the separate volume. Since there are 
relatively few law libraries in this country that contain the bound volumes 
of the Hague Academy, it is regrettable that these and some of the 
other lectures in the series cannot be made more accessible to scholars 
and practitioners through the device of reprinting individual lectures 
in separate volumes for public distribution. Separate publication might 
lead to more comprehensive reviews in a wider variety of journals and 
consequent greater awareness in the profession of the value and availa-
bility of the Hague Lectures. The magnitude of the task of reviewing 
the Hague Academy volumes may well explain the paucity of systematic 
and thorough analyses of these Lectures. This is a salient example 
of the bibliographical difficulties which impede the development of a 
wider knowledge and interest in international law at a time when such 
knowledge and interest is of vital importance. 
Dr. Freeman has assembled a wide range of materials of value to 
practicing lawyers, government officials, and scholars. The developing 
practice of stationing armed forces in friendly countries for lengthy 
periods in peace time enhances the importance of greater understanding 
of the governing principles, practices, and procedures. The author's 
previous publications in the field of state responsibility and his extensive 
experience provide an excellent basis for this specialized study. 
A summary of the volume's contents and of Dr. Freeman's views on 
significant topics should illustrate the value of his intensive analysis 
1959] RECENT BOOKS 1269 
of the subject. Following a brief introduction and outline of the scope 
of the lectures, the first chapter surveys the general principles of state 
responsibility as they have developed in the practice of states and the 
views of publicists. In discussing responsibility for official acts, it is urged 
that there is no distinction in principle between major and minor officials 
of a state. What acts of minor officials, and, particularly, of soldiers should 
impose responsibility can be usefully determined by an adaptation of 
Professor Dunn's theory of risk allocation. Responsibility for acts of soldiers 
is not limited to authorized acts but includes all acts apparently authorized 
if reasonably related to duty. In time of peace, purely personal acts do 
not give rise to responsibility whereas, ironically, the reverse is true in 
time of war. 
The second chapter develops the basis of responsibility for military 
activities both in time of war and peace. For the war situation, responsi-
bility is intimately linked to the laws of war which provide an exemption 
for legitimate military operations. It follows, in principle, that states 
are responsible for violations of the laws of war. So far as liability between 
belligerents is concerned, precedents and procedures vindicating the prin-
ciple in practice are scarce, due largely to waiver by the losers in peace 
treaties following hostilities. Although claims of neutrals remain, these 
have been frequently settled by payment as an "act of grace" and thus 
impede the development of authoritative precedents. The principles of 
the laws of war have been "whittled away to some degree" by the practice 
in the last two great wars. Discussing a few of the rules in Hague Con-
vention IV on Land Warfare, for example, continuing vitality is attributed 
to the prohibition of confiscation of enemy private property despite the 
evidence to the contrary in the World War II peace treaties. Support for 
this position is found in the Dirksen and Johnson bills which were intro-
duced in Congress, although no final action upon them has been taken, 
and many of our war-time allies are strongly opposed to their enactment. 
With respect to liability in time of peace, the author challenges the view 
that responsibility exists only if the acts were authorized or if there was 
failure of supervision. He argues that the precedents justify the imposition 
of greater responsibility for acts of soldiers than other state agents because 
of the greater likelihood of harm, and that responsibility exists for 
negligent acts of soldiers in course of duty whether or not authorized or 
supervised. 
Chapter Three divides the discussion of responsibility for the acts 
of individual soldiers in time of war into two periods. The first relates 
to responsibility as developed prior to Hague Convention IV of 1907. 
In the earlier period, pillage, for example, was not illegal, and to this 
fact is assigned the reluctance of international tribunals to impose re-
sponsibility in such cases even after pillage was formally proscribed in 
Hague Convention IV and other international conventions. Although 
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acknowledging that pillage in practice µnfortunately continues, these 
conventions, and particularly Hague Convention IV, are viewed as 
working a great change in the law in force. The discussion of the post-
Hague period is devoted to an intensive analysis of the language of 
Article 3 of Hague Convention IV. This Article confirmed the existing 
liability of belligerents for violations of the laws of war and created a 
civil responsibility of the state for all acts committed by its armed forces. 
This state civil responsibility includes "war crimes." Article 3 imposes 
responsibility for all acts in violation of the Regulations of the Hague 
Convention, but is not exclusive with respect to responsibility under 
international law outside the Convention. The author disputes the 
contention of some other writers that Article 3 creates absolute respon-
sibility, citing in support of his position the similar official view adopted 
by the U.S. War Department during World War II. 
Chapter Four considers responsibility for acts of soldiers in foreign 
territory. The first part discusses illegalities committed in friendly coun-
tries and is primarily devoted to the practice of the United States. As 
a matter of analysis, these matters are governed by the same principles that 
have been applied in "shore leave" cases. The settlement of many of these 
controversies_ by payments as "acts of grace" is, however, acknowledged 
to be a widespread practice. The same tendency to settle on a broader 
basis is reflected in United States legislation. In the Foreign Claims Act 
of 1942, the United States has assumed approximately the position of an 
insurer without reference to responsibility under international law, al-
though the limitations in that act are duly noted. Similarly, the special 
Agreements entered into, by the United States in World War II attempted 
to provide for relief beyond international law, and to adjust to local 
administration. In the discussion of responsibility for acts of U.N. forces 
in the Korean conflict, the author asserts that the individual nations 
remained responsible; that the U.N. was not; and raises the question as to 
whether the United States was responsible for acts of other armed forces 
under United States command. He concludes this section with a discussion 
of the refusal of the United States to accept responsibility in paternity 
cases, particularly in Iceland, and suggests that some relief should be 
provided by agreement even though no legal liability exists. The second 
part of Chapter Four deals briefty with the precedents concerning re-
sponsibility of the occupant for acts of soldiers in territory under military 
occupation in the period prior to World War II. The author believes 
that responsibility in this area is governed by essentially the same prin-
ciples that are applicable to acts of soldiers within the territorial 
jurisdiction. 
The final chapter provides a valuable discussion of the claims settle-
ment procedures in the period after hostilities have ended. The author 
asserts that the responsibility of the occupying power should be the same 
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as that of a territorial sovereign in time of peace because of the similar 
"control of the area." United States practice after World War I is first 
briefly reported. There follows a thorough recital of allied practice and 
procedures after World War II. The similarity between our practice in 
the United States zone in Germany and our practice in liberated France 
is noted, as well as the limitations on liability in Germany. The develop-
ments in other occupied areas are also described and compared with our 
experience in Germany. The next section of the final chapter analyzes 
the impact of peace treaty provisions on responsibility. It recounts the 
new arrangements in World War II by the victors for restitution of 
identifiable property in lieu of damages as well as the provisions for the 
retention of enemy assets seized by the victors within their own borders. 
The standard provisions for inclusive waiver by the losers of all their 
claims both for violation of war rules and occupation acts are contrasted 
with the responsibility of victorious belligerents for alleged violations of 
the laws of war under Article 3 of Hague Convention IV. 
The final section of the chapter outlines the novel and extensive 
provisions for civil liability for tortious acts contained in the Status 
of Forces Agreements between the N.A.T.O. powers. In these special 
arrangements, which are characterized as both necessary and as the most 
radical and interesting development, there is provision for intergovern-
mental waiver in "duty" cases and an effective procedure for compensation 
with respect to private claims. In "line of duty" cases, payment by the 
local government in accordance with local law is followed by seventy-five 
percent reimbursement by the government of the visiting force. For so-
called "private acts," either the visiting force settles the claim as a matter 
of grace, or the soldier can be sued in the local courts. 
In conclusion, the author asserts that there has been a "striking 
progression" in liability for wrongful acts of a state's armed forces, 
especially in war and hostile occupation. He sees, also, a similar but less 
pronounced evolution in the standards for responsibility in time of peace, 
which is particularly marked in friendly countries. But the development 
of this trend, in his opinion, continues to depend on the viability of inter-
national law itself. 
Without detracting from the acclaim which this careful monograph 
deserves, this reviewer must confess some dissatisfaction with the traditional 
approach which it exemplifies. The author's detailed treatment of arbitral 
decisions on the basis of their importance as legal rules that regulate 
effectively the conduct of states is not persuasive. His apparent acceptance 
of the continued vitality of many of the Hague Articles, despite wide-
spread violation in two World Wars and their frequent negation by 
peace treaty provisions, is not convincing. The alleged inviolability of 
enemy property may be cited as an example. In my opinion, the provisions 
of the peace treaties, concluded after widespread hostilities by numerous 
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participants, are a better indication of the practice of states. The inclusive 
waiver in those treaties by the losers of all claims for violation of the 
laws of war is a far more significant development. The same may be said 
of the common provision for waiver of liability for occupation acts and 
the frequent payment of claims as "acts of grace." The principles and 
procedures created by United States legislation and by the Status of 
Forces Agreements are a more trustworthy guide to the responsibilities 
actually assumed by many of the principal states concerned with the 
problem in peace time. A broader view of "law" would consider that 
this national legislation and these treaty provisions constitute the core 
of the "law" in force. Intensive analysis of their administration would be 
the most promising avenue of exploration. Further study and development 
of the "law" in these documents and arising out of their administration 
will furnish the basis for further progress in this important area. 
Brunson MacChesney, 
Professor of Law, 
Northwestern University 
